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THE RULE OF NONREVIEW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF APPELLATE SCRUTINY OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES
Within the federal judicial system and the majority of state courts,
decisions as to the type and length of sentence imposed on a criminal
defendant are solely for the discretion of the trial court.' The
courts have therefore formulated a "rule of nonreview" which states
that criminal sentences are unreviewable on appeal except to determine
whether they fall within statutory limits. 2 Thoughtful courts and legal
commentators, however, recognizing that where the exercise of discre-
tion exists, there also exists a potential for its abuse,; have diluted the
1. The Supreme Court spoke of "traditional sentencing doctrine" when it stated re-
cently that there exists in the federal system "long-established authority ...vesting the
sentencing function exclusively in the trial court." Dorszynski v. United States, 94 S.
Ct. 3042, 3051 (1974) (footnote omitted). See generally Kadish, Legal Norm and Dis-
cretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REV. 904 (1962). For a sur-
vey of the status of the review of criminal sentences by state appellate courts, see
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15
VAND. L. REv. 671,688 apps. A & B (1962).
2. As noted by the Supreme Court, the cases have held that "if a court [has) imposed
a sentence within [the permissible statutory] range, his exercise of discretion as to
where within the permissible range sentence should be fixed [is] not subject to chal-
lenge." 94 S. Ct. at 3051. See also United States v. Hetterington, 279 F.2d 792, 796
(7th Cir. 1960). See note 18 infra. The rule has been stated variously throughout this
century: "If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly established,
it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits
allowed by a statute." Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). See
also 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 533 (1969). The federal courts
refuse to review sentences, not because they quarrel with the merits of the procedure,
but because they feel they lack the power to do so. The following deferral to the
superior authority of Congress is common in the entire area of federal criminal sen-
tencing:
[In this case] we are asked to enter the domain of penology, and more par-
ticularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of punish-
ment. Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment,
whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility . . . these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy. Equally so are the much mooted problems
relating to the power of the judiciary to review sentences .... This Court
has no such power.
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). Accord, Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
3. See generally Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Vie'wed from
Above, 22 SYRAcusE L. REV. 635 (1971). A few scattered opinions represent authority
for review upon a showing that the trial court has abused its discretion. The holding
is generally made, however, without any discussion of the nature of the abuse. See,
e.g, Hood v. United States, 469 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. King, 420
F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Wiener, 418
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rule of nonreview by annexing to it a significant set of exceptions.
I hough the theme binding these scattered exceptions focuses upon abuse
of sentencing discretion, few courts have thoroughly considered the na-
ture of discretion or the acts which may constitute its abuse. This Com-
ment argues that, consistent with protection of individual rights through-
out the criminal judicial process in the federal courts, a more structured
framework is needed within which discretion may be exercised and re-
viewed.5
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE RULE OF NONREVIEW
Authority for the rule that federal courts of appeals cannot review
sentences imposed by district courts resides in unconvincing logic sup-
ported by insubstantial legislative history. Under the Judicature Act of
1879,6 the old circuit courts explicitly were authorized "to pronounce
final sentence." 7 The Act of March 3, 1891,8 in reorganizing the federal
court system, deleted the reference to sentencing, and stated in its stead
that the circuit courts of appeals were to "exercise appellate jurisdiction
to review by appeal or by writ final decision in the district court ...... 9
This change in wording was interpreted by the courts as abrogating their
power to review sentencing decisions.10
F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Latimer, 415 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1969); Leach
v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Livers v. United States, 185 F.2d 807
(6th Cir. 1950); Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18 (4th Cir.), cert. de7iied, 271 U.S.
664 (1926).
4. See notes 45-89 infra & accompanying text.
5. This Comment is concerned with the review of sentencing discretion as it operates in
the federal context, where sentencing following trial either to judge or jury is con-
ducted solely from the bench. For an analysis of problems inherent in jury sentencing
see Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968 (1967).
6. Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354.
7. Id. § 3.
8. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
9. Id. § 6.
10. Noting that the changed wording of the 1891 statute was the impetus for its
decision, the court in Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), held
that it could not review any sentences which fell within statutory limits. Freeman
distinguished two earlier, contrary cases as having been decided under the 1879 statute.
Id. at 357, citing United States v. Wynn, 11 F. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882) and Bates v.
United States, 10 F. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881) (circuit court may alter sentence imposed
below even though it affirms the judgment). The court in Freeman stated: "There is
no [similar] provision in the Act creating the Circuit Court of Appeals. Those courts
are given only appellate jurisdiction to review [a] final decision in the District Court."
243 F. at 357. See also Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473 (9th Cir. 1900) (court im-
plies that sentences within statutory limit are unreviewable). But see Ballev v. United
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Though few courts actually considered the validity of this interpreta-
tion of the 1891 statute," the position was not unreasonable in light of
the statute's wording and the inclusion of a repealer clause invalidating
all prior inconsistent statutes.'" The statute was revised once more,'3
however, in 1948, during the codification of the judicial code.14 Now
section 2106 of Title 28, the statute provides that federal courts
of appellate jurisdiction "may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it
for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such ap-
propriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings
as may be just under the circumstances." 'I The Supreme Court has
stated that, "[f] inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The
sentence is the judgment." 16 Literal construction of section 2106 there-
fore yields the conclusion that circuit courts of appeals do have the au-
thority to review sentences.' 7
States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895) (all powers extant under Judicature Act held preserved in
later act, even though not reiterated in express terms).
An alternative statement of the nonreview rule forbids appellate scrutiny of a crim-
inal sentence unless it amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution. See Rodriguez v. United States, 394 F.2d
825 (5th Cir. 1968); Richards v. United States, 193 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1951). This
formulation, however, is no more conducive to review than the stricter rule, because
courts of appeals consistently have held that a sentence within the statutory limits is not
cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642, 652 (5th
Cir. 1968); Hendrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121, 124 (10th Cir. 1966); Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1959).
A convicted defendant, faced with a sentence which he believes to be excessive in
spite of its legality, must direct his constitutional attack not against the lawful sentence,
but against the statute which authorizes it. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583,
607 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), citing Hemans v. United States, 163
F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Johnson v. United States, 126
F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1942); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936). Appel-
lant's task thus becomes monumental, and his prospect for relief, tentative at best.
11. Coburn, Disparity of Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RurGaRs
L. REv. 207, 214-15 (1971).
12. The clause states, in pertinent part: "[All acts and parts of acts relating to appeals
or writs of error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error
in . . . this act are hereby repealed." Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 14, 26 Stat. 829,
830.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
14. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
16. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937); Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S.
206, 210 (1932); Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 335 (8th Cir. 1954).
17. Legislative history does not aid in the inquiry. See generally Coburn, supra note
11, at 213-15. The inquiry should end, however, if the statute is unambiguous on its
[Vol. 17:184
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The majority of courts, however, content to rest upon precedent,
have refused to examine critically section 2106 in regard to the rule of
nonreview 18 This reliance upon precedent is curious since the rule was
formulated under the earlier and completely different version of the
statute. Moreover, precedent was easily disregarded in the analogous case
of civil judgments, when, during the 1950's, the courts, with little more
face. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). Accord, Hamilton v. Rath-
bone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899). See 2A SuTmHaEaxA's STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02,
at 4 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
Under section 2106, a court of appeals is allowed to order a new trial when it deems
the evidence insufficient to support a conviction. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552,
554-58 (1950). "Aside from this rather restricted use of section 2106, the [Supreme]
Court has never applied it in its full scope." Note, Daniels v. United States: Appellate
Review of Criminal Sentencing-Limiting the Scope of the Non-Review Doctrine, 33
U. Prrr. L. REv. 917, 926 (1972).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, noting that "[n]o decision by the
Supreme Court or any federal court of appeals seems to have cited or considered this
statute in passing on the question of the power to reduce a sentence when a conviction
is affirmed," stated that "[wiere this question res nova, this court should give
[section 2106] serious consideration." United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). The court, however, deferred to "six decades
[of] federal decisions, including that of the Supreme Court" and denied the power of
sentence review. Id. Stated the court: "[I]t is clear that the Supreme Court alone
is in a position to hold that Sec. 2106 confers authority to reduce a sentence which is
not outside the bounds set by a valid statute." id. at 606-07 (footnote omitted).
18. Most recently, in Dorszynski v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 3042 (1974), the Court,
examining the propriety of a sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970), stated: 'We begin with the general proposition that once
it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under
which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end." Id. at 3047. Authority cited by the
Court for this proposition included only one case decided subsequent to the codifica-
tion of section 2106: Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), cited at 94 S. Ct. at
3042. Therein the Court merely referred to the issue of sentence review as a problem
"much mooted," and one for the legislature. 357 U.S. at 393. Surely such a cursory
disposition of this issue suggests that the Court overlooked the import of the new
language of section 2106. See note 100 infra.
In Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), the court, concluding that
a sentence within statutory limits imposed upon a drug offender was "greater than
should have been imposed," id. at 467, noted the neglected potential of section 2106, but
nonetheless continued: "This section has been on the books since the Judiciary Act of
1789, but we have been cited to no case in which it has been held authority for the
modification or vacation of a sentence within the statutory limits." Id. (footnote
omitted). The court then relied upon several leading cases as support for the non-
review rule. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), cited at 273
F.2d at 467; United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952), quoted at 273 F.2d at 467 and discussed in note 17 supra; Gurera v. United
States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930), cited at 273 F.2d at 468. The validity of this logic,
which is sustained by a series of one line holdings, some of which were actually interprat-
ing the review statute before the 1948 codification, is questionable. See Smith v. United
States, supra at 469 (dissenting opinion).
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than an apology to then existing precedent, rejected the longstanding
rule that the size of civil awards, even when alleged to be excessive,
would not be reviewed except for errors of law.19 Given the rejection
of the rule of nonreview of civil judgments, and in light of the less than
substantial basis upon which the rule of nonreview in criminal cases was
formulated,20 the latter rule should also be discarded.21 Unfortunately,
the entrenched status of the rule may be such that only legislative action
specifically authorizing sentence review will effect a change.2
It is possible, though, that the developing doctrine of appellate super-
visory power could influence courts of appeals to reject the rule of non-
review in the absence of specific legislative action. This doctrine holds
that appellate courts have the duty to assure that actions of the district
courts comport with just administration of the laws. In McNaff v. United
States,23 Justice Frankfurter, rejecting the contention that the role of the
19. See generally Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MiN-N.
L. REv. 751, 752-58 (1957). See, e.g., Southern Ry.-Carolina Div. v. Bennett, 233 U.S.
80, 87 (1914); Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1945). In
Bucker v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953), prece-
dent holding that verdicts are not reviewable for excessiveness was dismissed as "an old
procedural impediment." Id. at 586. See also, Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F.2d 22, 25-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d
926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d
400, 407-09 (4th Cir. 1948).
20. See Coburn, supra note 11, at 215.
21. The demise of the rule of nonreview in civil cases, and perpetuation of the rule
in criminal cases, ironically permits review of tort damages but not of sentences,
thereby providing greater protection for property rights than for individual liberty.
Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134,
1166 (1960).
22. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 229, 305 (1932); Richards v. United States, 193 F.2d 554, 556 (10th Cir.
1951). The views of several federal judges are presented in Appellate Review of Sen-
tencing: A Symposiun, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962). A few judges have recognized the
potential of section 2106 as obviating the need for specific legislation. Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462, 468-69 (10th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion); United States v.
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). For a dis-
cussion of alternative interpretations of section 2106, see Comment, Appellate Review
of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 221, 230-31 (1972).
Though congressional committees have studied the problem of the rule of non-
review, no laws on the subject have yet been passed. See, e.g., S. 27722, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966). Discussion by co-sponsors of a bill allowing sentence review may be
found in Hruska, Appellate Review of Sentences, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 10 (1969) and Tydings,
Ensuring Rational Sentences-The Case for Appellate Review, 53 J. AM. Juo. Soc'y 68
(1969). For a scholarly treatment of similar legislation, see Burr, Appellate Review as
a Means of Controlling Crininal Sentencing Discretion-A Workable Alternative?, 33
U. PiTt. L. REv. 1 (1971).
23. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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federal appellate courts in the review of criminal judgments is limited to
ascertaining their constitutional validity, stated: "Judicial supervision
of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
and evidence." 24 Though federal courts have recognized this principle 2 5
it has not yet been used to provide authority for the power to review
sentences.
Significantly, a few appellate cases do provide some precedent for
sentence review where there is involved a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights, 26 or a misrepresentation 2T or misuse28 of the relevant
sentencing provision. Courts also are sensitive to sentencing errors where
no statutory maximum sentence exists29 and where a defendant is subject
to an increase in sentence on retrial.3
Moreover, several statutory provisions allow review in limited
circumstances at the trial level. Section 2255 of Title 28 of the Judicial
Code,"' for example, provides general relief from illegal or unconstitu-
tional sentences upon petition to the trial court that originally set the
sentence.3 2 Additionally, under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
24. Id. at 340.
25. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (supervisory power
and act under review gave courts of appeals power to issue writs of mandamus in par-
ticular instances); Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (appellate court
has jurisdiction to review stay of proceeding in district court).
26. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738-41 (1948) (denial of due process
of law where sentence based in part on presentence report which either contained mis-
information or was misread by sentencing judge).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 392 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1968) (sentence vacated
and case remanded where trial judge misunderstood statute to require imposition of
maximum sentence as prerequisite for early parole consideration).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence va-
cated and remanded with instructions where trial court believed statutory maximum
sentence was too lenient and instead imposed longer sentence under FYCA in violation
of its clear rehabilitative purpose).
29. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam).
30. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Marano v. United States,
374 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1967); Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
32. The provision states in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sen-
tence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. 2255 (1970). For examples of the appropriate uses of section 2255, see
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inal Procedure,33 a convicted defendant may seek correction of an illegal
or excessive sentence by petitioning the trial court.3 4 Neither of these
remedies, however, provides for a change of forum or for a different
judge, either of which may be crucial to the success of such an appeal.3 5
And ironically, Rule 35 has been cited to restrict the scope of appellate
review.3 6
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
During the last decade, appellate courts have begun to develop a com-
mon law of sentence review37 aimed at thorough examination of the sen-
tencing process, as opposed to review of the sentence itself. The impetus
for this development is found in the Supreme Court decision of Williams
v. New York, 38 which marked a shift from the nineteenth century penal
theory emphasizing retribution, to the modern view that criminals should
Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (section 2255 is appropriate
remedy where trial judge has abused his sentencing discretion) and Russell v. United
States, 507 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1974) (section 2255 is appropriate remedy where sen-
tencing judge has misapprehended the relevant sentencing statute).
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
34. The rule provides in pertinent part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence." Id. For a case on the proper applica-
tion of Rule 35, see United States v. Ellenbogan, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 918 (1968). The Ellenbogan court held that: "Rule 35 is intended to give
every convicted defendant a second round before the sentencing judge, and at the same
time it affords the judge an opportunity to reconsider the sentence in light of any
further information about the defendant or the case which may have been presented
to him in the interim." Id. at 543 (emphasis supplied). See generally 5 L. ORFIEL),
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES §§ 35:6-:42 (1967).
35. The correction of a sentence under Rule 35 must occur in the sentencing federal
district court. Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 569 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
926 (1948). The court of appeals may not reverse a refusal of the district court to cor-
rect a sentence alleged to be illegal. Roth v. United States, 255 F.2d 440 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958).
36. In United States v. Adams, 449 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1971), for example, although
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit implied that the sentence before it was
"unduly harsh," it refused to review the sentence because Rule 35 provided a remedy
at the trial court level. Id. at 124. Cases decided prior to the passage of the Federal
Rules held that the courts of appeals could modify an illegal sentence, see, e.g., Simmons
v. United States, 89 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937); Johnson v.
United States, 32 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1929); Goode v. United States, 12 F.2d 742 (8th
Cir. 1926), or remand the case for resentencing, see, e.g., Millich v. United States, 282
F. 604 (9th Cit. 1922); Salazar v. United States, 236 F. 541 (8th Cir. 1916).
37. The absence of statutory standards for appellate review has, until recently, in-
hibited the development of a common law in this area. See Weigel, Appellate Revision
of Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REv. 405, 410 (1968).
38. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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be treated in a manner which will prepare them for a productive return
to society. 9 This rehabilitative approach, implemented through "indi-
vidualized sentencing", holds that "sentencing functions best when the
judge [accounts for] the offender's needs." 40
The rationale for individualized sentencing is that "the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime .... The belief no
longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an
identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a par-
ticular offender." 41 This theory therefore demands that the trial court
have as thorough an understanding as possible of the defendant's criminal
history, and past and present mental condition.42
It is this need for accurate presentence information 3 in the context of
individualized sentencing which has led some courts of appeals to examine
the procedures44 followed by district courts in their deliberations prece-
39. Id. at 248. Classical penology, "which [sought] to assess for each crime its 'just'
punishment, began to wither away with the growth of the conviction that no statutory
definition of a crime is narrow enough to encompass only one class of evil acts or evil
doers." Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Reviezw of Legal but Excessive Sen-
tences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 674 (1962). At present, there are four recognized goals of
criminal corrections: deterrence, protection of society, retribution, and rehabilitation.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 n.13 (1949).
40. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR SENrENCING 4-5 (1957).
In adopting the standard of individualized sentencing, the federal courts have not aban-
doned consideration of the other functions of criminal corrections. "There thus re-
mains room, even when imposing an acceptably 'individualized' sentence, for a judge
to look beyond the offender to the sentence's presumed effect on others." United States
v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 528 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526-31
(1968) (deterrence remains valid consideration in sentencing). But cf. United States
v. Walker, 469 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (1st Cir. 1972) (defendant urged to seek a reduction
in sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure where it ap-
peared that trial court imposed maximum sentence solely for its deterrent effect).
41. 337 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
42. In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), sentencing on the basis of inaccurate
information was held to be a denial of due process. In Williams, however, it was held
that information considered by the sentencing judge, though required to be free of
error, may include evidence not admissible at trial. 337 U.S. at 250-51. Such evidence
may include "all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the
crime." Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 578 (1959).
43. In the federal courts, most of this information is contained in a presentence
report which is prepared by the United States Probation Office and presented to the
trial judge prior to sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). Additionally, through the
exercise of the right of allocution, both defendant and his counsel may offer informa-
tion in mitigation of punishment. Id. 32(a) (1).
44. Procedure in this context refers to all of the acts of a trial court judge in gather-
ing and assimilating information concerning a defendant he is about to sentence. It in-
cludes both the mechanical and the mental processes leading to imposition of punish-
ment.
19751
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dent to sentencing. Although not stated as such, these decisions have
created a loosely-formulated exception to the nonreview rule allowing
appellate review of sentences for abuse of discretion in the trial court.
The abuses which thus far have been recognized may be separated into
two general categories.
Nonexercise of Discretion
The exercise of discretion requires choice and decision by the trial
court among available alternative dispositions. 45 A proper sentence may
not be reached through a mechanical process in which factors other than
those significant to individualized sentencing dictate the answer.46 In
point is the case of United States v. Daniels,47 wherein defendant was
convicted of willfully failing to report to his local selective service board
for instructions to perform work consistent with his status as a conscien-
tious objector. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
conviction for violation of the Selective Service laws, but remanded the
case for reconsideration of the five year sentence, suggesting that the
district judge consider suspending sentence and granting probation on
the condition that defendant, under order of the court, perform the con-
scientious objector work he had refused to perform under orders of the
Selective Service Board.48 The District Court for the District of Ken-
tucky, defending the concept of insulated sentencing discretion in the
trial court, reimposed the same sentence.49 In a second appeal, the ap-
pellate court again remanded the case, this time with instructions to
enter a 25 month probationary period."°
The court in Daniels II, impressed by the "peculiar facts" 5 of the case,
found that the trial judge had imposed on the sentencing process his own
philosophical view of the nature of the crime, had failed to adopt the
theory of individualized sentencing, and had failed to exercise his dis-
cretion by levying the maximum sentence in every case of this nature. "
The district court was chastised for failing to gather, assimilate, and eval-
uate information about the defendant which would have been relevant
45. In his dissent to Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), Justice Rutledge referred
to the exercise of discretion as "the very essence of judicial process." Id. at 734.
46. See Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973).
47. 429 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 1274.
49. United States v. Daniels, 319 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
50. United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 968.
52. Id. at 968-72.
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to his rehabilitation. In failing to consider mitigating circumstances, and
in choosing instead to follow a fixed policy of sentencing, 53 the district
court was found to have abused its discretion by refusing to exercise itY4
Another case illustrating a trend toward remand for resentencing upon
a finding of abuse of discretion in the form of nonexercise is United States
v. Wilson.ns Therein, the defendant, a youth convicted of forgery and
eligible for sentencing under the Young Adult Offenders Act,56 was
sentenced to three years imprisonment. The record and opinion at trial,
however, did not indicate whether the district court had considered the
lenient rehabilitative provisions of that Act in rendering sentence. On
appeal, the court noted that the sum in question, less than one hundred
dollars, did not seem to warrant such a severe sentence, especially in the
absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of mitigating
ones, including the recommendation for probation by the probation of-
ficer.57 After offering token words of deference to the nonreview rule,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, stating that it had authority
to "scrutinize a sentence to ascertain whether there [had] indeed been
an exercise of discretion," and concluding that if the sentence was "the
product of sheer inadvertance, then it would not be a deliberate exercise
of judicial discretion," 58 remanded the case for resentencing so that all
53. In oral argument during the resentencing, the district court judge stated that in
the thirty years he had spent on the federal bench, he had always felt that "cases of
this kind [a refusal to obey an order of the local draft board] ...deserve a five year
sentence" because the crime "strikes at the very foundations and fundamentals ...of
our whole governmental system." Hon. Mac Swinford, District Judge for the District
of-Kentucky, quoted in 446 F.2d at 969.
54. An exercise of discretion clearly was required by the language of the statute under
which defendant was punished, providing for a sentence of "not more than five years."
50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1970). By imposing the same sentence on all draft offenders, the
district judge exhibited an inflexibility contrary to the legislative will that lesser sen-
tences be given where appropriate.
In United States v. Charles, 460 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1972), the court again found
that the Kentucky district court had abused its discretion by imposing a maximum
statutory sentence. Although the judge "took pains to suggest" that he was sentencing
on an individual basis, the appellate court stated that it was "evident that the real
basis for sentencing was simply the District Judge's belief that no person charged with
a draft offense should serve less time in prison than he would have served in the mili-
tary had he accepted induction." Id. at 1095. This belief, the court held, was not "a
proper basis" for sentencing. See also United States v. Baker, 487 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1973)
(court's disapproval of standard sentencing policy extends to the practice "of never in-
carcerating, as well as . . .always incarcerating." Id. at 361).
55. 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970).
57. 450 F.2d at 496.
58. Id. at 498. See also United States v. Noland, 510 F.2d 1093 (1975) (sentencing
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sentencing options available to the defendant could be considered. 9
Yet another case where nonexercise of discretion was held to consti-
tute an abuse requiring remand for resentencing is Coleman v. United
States.6" Therein, a statute61 expressly permitted, but did not require, a
district court to consider mitigating and aggravating factors in the con-
text of reducing a sentence of death to one of life imprisonment. Where
a defendant convicted of first degree murder was sentenced to death and
where there was no indication that significant mitigating factors had been
considered,62 the appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the
case with instructions that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed."3
The court held that, despite his broad discretion, "a sentencing judge
must always conform with the law governing the sentencing function." 64
The fact that "incorrect standards" were followed by the district court
precluded "the application . . . of the well settled rule that an appellate
court will not disturb a sentence imposed by a trial court within the lati-
tude allowed by statute." 65
A similar result obtained under Leach v. United States,66 wherein the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed a conviction of
armed robbery, but vacated the sentence because the trial court apparent-
judge's statements concerning Young Adult Offenders Act illustrated use of necessary
discretion); United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
105 (1974) (where possibility existed that sentencing judge misunderstood the pre-
sentence report, and disparity existed between sentence under review and lesser sen-
tences of more violent second offenders, discretion was improperly exercised).
59. 450 F.2d at 498.
60. 357 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
61. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2404 (Supp. IV 1965).
62. The single aggravating factor was that the victim of the crime was a policeman.
Several important mitigating factors existed: defendant had no prior criminal record
and an acceptable military and employment record; defendant's brother had instigated
the crime; defendant was unarmed when he first met the victim; defendant committed
the crime in a panic; the crime was committed with the policeman's gun indicating no
premeditationas to homicide; defendant was mentally retarded; defendant surrendered
himself to authorities; prison chaplains and a probation officer considered defendant a
model prisoner who would benefit from parole. 357 F.2d at 563-69 (passin).
63. Id. at 573. The court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970) as authority for its decision
to instruct the entry of a particular sentence rather than merely remanding the case for
resentencing. Id. at 572.
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (where defendant, an alien, was found guilty of housebreaking, and sentenced
to imprisonment, case was remanded so that the sentencing judge could consider whether
rehabilitation was more likely to result from deportation than from imprisonment).
66. 320 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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ly had not employed or even considered a statutory provision authorizing
a presentence mental examination 7 despite defendant's request for one.
On remand,6" the district court reimposed the same sentence, stating that
its decision was based on all relevant individual factors. 9 The Court of
Appeals was not impressed and again set aside the sentence, remanding
the case with instructions that defendant undergo a mental examination
prior to resentencing.7 ° The appellate court noted that defendant's rec-
ord, which indicated habitual criminality, and the presentence report,
which described defendant as the classical picture of the psychopathic
offender, warranted a psychiatric examination.71 Stating that the district
court's refusal to so order an examination constituted an abuse of discre-
tion, the court ruled "that the sentencing judge should use some of the
resources which Congress has provided and that he may not arbitrarily
ignore the data properly obtained thereby." 72 Although the court in
Leach stated explicitly that it did not question the rule of nonreview, the
case represents a significant exception to the rule: district courts must
consider all relevant statutory sentencing provisions prior to rendering a
final sentence. 3
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-106 (1961).
68. United States v. Leach, 218 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1963).
69. The district judge stated that the following reasons justified reimposing the same
sentence without first ordering a psychiatric examination of the defendant: the serious-
ness of the crime, defendant's extensive prior criminal record, the fact that the pro-
bation officer assigned to the case chose not to recommend defendant for a mental
examination, and the fact that no competent evidence was received to indicate that
defendant suffered from mental illness. Id. at 274.
70. Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964). On the second remand, the
District Court for the District of Columbia complied with the instructions of the Court
of Appeals. United States v. Leach, 231 F. Supp. 544 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966).
Two statutes provided for psychiatric evaluation of defendant prior to sentencing.
D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 124-106 (1973). Additionally,
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for a period within which a
judge, after further consideration, may reduce the severity of an initial sentence. FrD.
R. CRIM. P. 35. See notes 33-36 supra & accompanying text.
71. The Court of Appeals was influenced, as it had been in Briscoe v. United States,
391 F.2d 984, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1968), with the fact that if the sentencing judge did not
consider fully all of the alternative dispositions, defendant would not receive such
consideration elsewhere. 334 F.2d at 948.
72. 334 F.2d at 951.
73. Similarly, a sentencing court may not arbitrarily refuse the defendant an oppor-
tunity to present the court with a presentence report in mitigation of punishment.
Peters v. United States, 307 F.2d 193, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1962), citing, FED. R. CraM. P 32(c)
(court affirms conviction but vacates sentence ana remands per 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970)).
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Inclusion of Improper Factors
The proper exercise of discretion assumes not only that all relevant
information will be considered, but also that incorrect information or
standards will not be followed. Illustrating this point is the recent case
of United States v. Espinoza,74 in which the defendant, convicted of
narcotics violations, argued on appeal that he was not allowed, at the
lower level, to rebut erroneous information contained in his presentence
report75 In remanding the case for resentencing, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as involving "the right of a de-
fendant to at least minimal safeguards to insure that the sentencing court
does not rely on erroneous factual information when assessing sen-
tence." 76
The court in Espinoza first recognized that the majority of federal
jurisdictions do not give defendants an absolute right to view their pre-
sentence reports.7 7 Nonetheless, the court stated that when the sentencing
court relies upon a report containing allegedly erroneous information,
"fundamental fairness requires that [the] defendant be given at least
some opportunity to rebut that information." 78 The refusal of the trial
court to afford this opportunity was "tantamount to an abuse of discre-
tion and.., inconsistent with the need for enlightened sentencing." 19
74. 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932) (appellate court defers to decision of trial court though no reasons given).
75. The information related to defendant's prior criminal record. Defense counsel
stated that he believed defendant had never been convicted of a felony. The trial judge,
however, during sentencing, referred to a "bad record" for threats and assaults, although
he was not sure himself whether defendant in fact had ever been convicted. 481 F.2d
at 553.
76. Id. at 555.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States v.
Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); Thompson v.
United States, 381 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972) (sentencing court relied on invalid convictions); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentence based on materially untrue assumptions concerning crim-
inal record); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967) (substantial con-
sideration given to legally impermissible factors).
78. 481 F.2d at 556.
79. Id. at 558. Although the court did not require it of the district court on remand,
it was noted in the appellate opinion that the lower court did not state its reasons for
denying the attempted rebuttal. Because of this, the court of appeals was unable to tell
if fully informed discretion had been exercised. Id. at 557-58. The argument for lower
courts providing appellate courts with a formal statement of the reasons supporting a
particular sentence often has been stated. See, e.g., Berkowitz, The Constitutional
Requirement for a Written Statement of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing
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In accord with this view is the case of United States v. Thompson.80
The defendant in Thompson, a self-declared black militant charged with
a Selective Service violation, had filed an affidavit at the district court
level seeking to disqualify the scheduled judge from presiding at his up-
coming trial.8 ' The affidavit charged that the scheduled judge had a
stated policy of giving draft violators he deemed "good people" 30 month
sentences, as opposed to black militant violators, who were given sen-
tences of four and one-half years.82 The motion was denied by the very
judge against whom it was directed.83 The defendant's subsequent con-
viction and sentence of 30 months imprisonment was reversed on appeal
and the case remanded for retrial under a different judge.84 In addition
to holding that a fixed policy of sentencing which did not consider the
individual needs of the defendant was error, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit found that the judge's policy indicated an impermissible
bias against the, defendant as a member both of a particular racial class
and of a class of criminal violators. The bias was of "such a nature and
intensity to prevent the defendant, when convicted, from obtaining a
sentence uninfluenced by the court's prejudgment concerning Selective
Service violators generally." 85
A recent decision in the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Maples,6 in-
volved a related problem. Therein, Maples, after receiving a greater sen-
tence for the crime of bank robbery than the minor female co-defendant
who had pleaded guilty to the charge along with him, appealed on the
grounds that the trial judge exercised an admitted discrimination on the
basis of age and sex.87 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 IowA L. REv. 205 (1974). But see, Hoffman,
Conducting the Sentencing Hearing in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPoI.rED UNITED STATES
DisTRicT JuDGEs 362, 330 (1971). See also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249
(1957). See note 102 infra & accompanying text.
80. 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973).
81. Defendant moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) which establishes three
criteria for a disqualification affidavit: 1) the facts alleged must be material and stated
with particularity, 2) the facts must be sufficient to convince a reasonable man of the
bias of the judge, and 3) the bias must be personal, not judicial.
82. Notwithstanding the racial aspect of this case, the judge's standard sentencing
policy was clearly an abuse of discretion. See notes 47-59 supra & accompanying text.
83. 483 F.2d at 528.
84. Id. at 529.
85. Id.
86. 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974).
87. The district judge, during sentencing, had stated that he did not accept "'these
modern philosophies . . .about women's liberation . . . "" Id. at 986, quoting the
remarks of the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Western District of North
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noting that in certain circumstances age could be a permissible ground
for disparity of sentences, stated that such could not be the case with
sex.s8 The court denied a general power to review sentences, but stated
that it had authority to correct those sentences imposed by an unconsti-
tutional process.89
STRUCTURED DISCRETION: TOWARD REJECTION OF THE
RULE OF NONREVIEW
As shown by the above analysis, the rule of nonreview has created
serious problems for the postadjudicatory stage of the criminal judicial
system. Before the inception of the concept of individualized sentencing,
criminals, though treated unfairly, were treated uniformly in that sen-
tences usually were predicated solely upon the crime in questionf 0 Re-
jection of the standard sentencing policy has accorded criminals a more
equitable system of sentencing, but also has created a greater potential
for abuse in the sentencing decision; the modern standard of individual-
ized sentencing invariably leads to greater opportunity for error, bias
and negligence.9' Recent commentary has noted that the present sys-
Carolina. Describing himself as "old-fashioned," the judge told Morrow, the female
co-defendant: "Because of your age and the fact that you are a woman, the Court
will not incarcerate you for quite as long as I did your codefendant." Id. There was
evidence of aggravating factors in Morrow's case which would have justified giving her
a harsher sentence than her co-defendant. For example, the idea of the robbery appar-
ently had been hers. Although it was not stated clearly by the appellate court, implicit
in its decision to vacate was the fact that the trial court had not considered these factors
in determining Morrow's sentence.
88. The court stated: "Under current law, and absent any proof that rehabilitation
or deterrence are more easily accomplished in the case of females rather than males,
we deem the factor of sex an impermissible one to justify a disparity in sentences."
Id. at 986.
89. Relying on Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the court held that sex
alone, even in combination with other proper factors "is an impermissible basis for
disparity in sentence . . . ." 501 F.2d at 985. The court considered but rejected the
idea of eliminating the disparity by increasing Morrow's term of imprisonment. Both
sentences were illegal because one resulted from undue preference and one from
undue discrimination. The only appropriate remedy was held to be resentencing of
Maples. Id. at 987. See also United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 504 (7th Cir. 1959)
(court rejected policy that one who elects to defend himself in court and is subsequently
convicted deserves a harsher sentence than a defendant who admits guilt in his plea).
90. See generally McGuire & Holtzoff, The Problens of Sentence in the Criminal
Law, 20 B.U.L. REv. 423 (1940). See notes 39-41 supra & accompanying text.
91. Burr, Appellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing Discre-
tion-A Workable Alternative?, 33 U. Pir. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1971).
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tem does not adequately protect the criminal from arbitrary," excessive,9 3
or disparate9 4 sentences. 5 This lack of protection necessarily fosters an
adverse psychological impact counterproductive to effective rehabilita-
tion of those sentenced.96
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the rule of nonreview focuses
upon its impropriety in a judicial system which otherwise guarantees
criminal defendants a high degree of procedural protection. For ex-
ample, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that dis-
cretion "is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court." 97 It is patently illogical to require intricate
safeguards during apprehension and arrest procedures, and to require a
standard for conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and then to
require only a "reasonable assurance" that the resultant sentence is not
improper9 8 Certainly criminal justice, with its awesome potential for
restricting human liberty, merits greater safeguards against misapplica-
tionY9
92. Dix, Judicial Review of Sentences: Implications for Individual Disposition, 1969
LAW & Soc. ORDER 367, 371.
93. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sen-
tences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 688-97 (1962).
94. See, e.g., Burr, supra note 91, at 8-9; Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences:
A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 56 (1967). Not only do sentencing policies
vary significantly among judges, but there is also evidence that the sentencing behavior
of an individual judge is subject to fluctuation. Burr, supra at 4.
95. Additionally, the isolated instances of review which have been identified often
have occurred where the trial court was unusually candid about its reasoning. The
current review situation appears to indicate to a trial court that its sentences are more
inviolate the less it attempts to explain them. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489
F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1974); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 140 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cit. 1971).
96. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS: COR-
RECTIONs 146 (1973). See Dix, supra note 92, at 371.
97. Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
98. One commentator has observed:
After a trial in which the rights of the accused are protected by elaborate
procedural rules which are themselves protected from official infringement
by the Constitution, the accused stands before a single person, the trial
judge, to learn what punishment society will exact for the crime he has
committed. Traditionally, that single person has virtually unassailable discre-
tion to award an exceedingly broad range of punishments.
Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requiremzent for a Written Statenment of Reasons and
Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 IowA L. REv.
205 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
99. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized this problem when it
stated in regard to sentencing procedures: "It is an anomaly that a judicial system
which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal de-
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As noted previously, there is little indication that the rule of nonreview
will be abolished in the near future.00 Consequently, it is submitted that
the role of appellate courts should be expanded by making efficient use
of the rule's one exception, review for abuse of discretion. This expan-
sion may be facilitated by "structuring" discretion.
In developing a system of structured discretion in the criminal sen-
tencing process, useful guidelines may be borrowed from the field of ad-
ministrative law. The sentencing expertise developed at the trial court
level may be likened to the expertise developed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its duties. The trial court's direct encounters
with criminal defendants, law enforcement officials, and experts in many
areas of penology enable it to draw on a more varied experience in sen-
tencing than is available to appellate courts. Recognizing the analogous
relationship between administrative agencies and trial courts, Professor
Kenneth C. Davis has recommended that the following administrative
tools of structuring be adapted to the criminal sentencing process: in-
formed appellate scrutiny of the sentencing judge's decisionmaking
process, development of policy statements, and adherence to precedent.10'
Informed appellate scrutiny of the sentencing judge's decisionmaking
process would be facilitated by demanding that the judge state all find-
fendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him should have so
neglected this most important dimension of fundamental justice." Shepard v. United
States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958). See Sobeloff, A Recoimnendation for Appellate
Review of Criminal Sentences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REv. 2, 2-3 (1954).
100. The recent Supreme Court decision in Dorszynski v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 3042
(1974), was a disappointment to many who had observed a trend toward increasing
sentence review. The Court firmly denied the existence of any judicial authority for
appellate sentence review. Id. at 3051. See note 18 supra.
Although federal legislation authorizing appellate review would end the problems
surrounding the rule of nonreview, the passage of such a bill in the near future, based
on the failure of several in the past, appears unlikely. See, e.g., S. 716, 93d Cong.. 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 2228, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1450, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
S. 823, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 3914, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). To date, none
of these have been enacted. See note 22 supra.
A further disappointment for the advocates of appellate sentence review has been
the performance of sentencing institutes authorized by a 1958 federal statute. 28 U.S.C.
S 334 (1970). This statute authorized joint councils of judges "for the purpose of
studying, discussing, and formulating the objectives, policies, standards, and criteria
for sentencing." Id. These institutes have not contributed significantly to the rationali-
zation of sentencing procedures, and have, in fact, been criticized in this regard by
some of their participants. See, e.g., Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Un-
j.stified Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences?, 42 F.R.D. 218, 220 (1967).
101. K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133 (1969).
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ings of fact and reasons for his decision in the record. This suggestion
is not new; 10 2 although courts have been unwilling to follow this sug-
gestion, critics of current sentencing procedures have included similar
requirements in their proposals for change. For instance, the American
Bar Association has stated, per section 5.6 of its Standards Relating to
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, that in imposing sentence,
the court "should make specific findings on all controverted issues of fact
which are deemed relevant to the sentencing decision" 103 and "nor-
mally should state for the record in the presence of the defendant the
reasons for selecting the particular sentence to be imposed." 104 It is
submitted that the word "normally" dilutes the force of the provision.
More extreme and consequently more desirable with regard to the trial
judge's statement of reasons, is the ABA's Standards Relating to Ap-
pellate Review of Sentences: "The sentencing judge should be required
in every case to state his reasons for selecting the particular sentence im-
posed." 10- Quite obviously, implementation of the above Standard
necessarily would increase the incidence of sentence review by exposing
improper factors which would otherwise remain undetected.
In advocating use of policy statements to guide the decisionmaking
process in sentence review, Davis focuses upon a need for the develop-
ment of a consensus within jurisdictions on specific issues regularly en-
countered by courts.0 6 Policy statements, notes Davis, should be formu-
lated by sentencing institutes rendering formal opinions on hypothetical
fact situations.' Most importantly, such statements need not confine
discretion; rather policy guidelines can add structure to the exercise of
discretion by providing, for example, that in particular fact situations,
specific factors will be determinative.
Finally, imposing upon the courts the duty to state findings and give
reasons for sentencing decisions will, in time, create a body of sentencing
102. See generally Berkowitz, supra note 98. See K. DAVIS, supra note 101, at 140.
103. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE § 5.6(i) (1968).
104. Id. § 5.6(ii).
105. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTIcE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 2.3(c) (1968). Cf. Model Penal
Code § 7.07(6).
106. For example, within a jurisdiction, answers to questions such as the following
could be developed: "whether a heavy sentence should even be imposed without a pre-
sentence investigation; . . . whether probation should be allowed in 20 percent of
felony cases or in 50 percent or in 80 percent; whether the characteristics of cases
suitable for probation can be identified . .. ." K. DAvis, supra note 101, at 139.
107. Id. at 139-40.
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law which will provide thoughtful analysis and precedent for courts con-
fronting similar situations. It should be emphasized, however, that the
sentencing judge should utilize precedent only as a tool to reach a more
informed opinion. Precedent in the law of sentencing should not be
binding, as this would create a rigidity fraught with all those deficiencies
inherent in a standard sentencing policy.
Implementation of the above discretion structuring devices has multi-
ple benefits. First, it would encourage a well-reasoned, generally un-
biased sentencing decision. Second, it would improve the image of the
sentencing process as being open, fair, and reasonably predictable. Third,
and most importantly, it would provide appellate courts with a sharper
lens with which to focus upon potential abuse of discretion in the sen-
tencing process at the trial level. Improper sentences would be detected
more easily; the incidence of review under the current exception to the
rule of nonreview, review for abuse of discretion, inevitably would be
increased.
Remedial action responsive to the concerns expressed in this Comment
may be initiated in various ways. Perhaps the most expeditious action
would be the amendment of Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure.108 It is submitted that in the interim, appellate courts
should create local rules to guide their respective district courts. An ad-
vantage to this latter approach is that the social and economic problems
peculiar to defendants in a particular area could be reflected in the
standards as they are developed. And of course, congressional action
remains a viable alternative. 10 9
In formulating a body of rules structuring discretion in the criminal
sentencing process, the rulemaker will have to distinguish between pro-
cedural discretion and substantive discretion. The former term refers
108. The rule, titled "Composition of Record on Appeal", now provides that the
record on appeal shall consist of the original papers and exhibits filed in the district
court, a transcript of the proceedings if one is made, and certified copies of all rele-
vant docket ehtries. FED. R. App. P. 10(a). It is proposed that the rule be amended
by inserting the following as § 10(a) (2):
Composition of the Record on Appeal-Criminal Appeals.
In a criminal case, the record on appeal shall include a statement of the
district court's findings of fact and law with regard to sentencing, a state-
ment of the court's reasoning with regard to the sentence imposed, and
citation to any precedent which was relied upon during sentencing.
A parallel amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), which would
impose on the trial court a duty to prepare a statement of findings and reasons for its
sentences, would assure an adequate record on appeal. FE. R. CRIM. P. 32 (a).
109. But see notes 22 & 100 supra.
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to the range of factors considered by a court in its sentencing decision.
The determination of whether a court has legitimately exercised pro-
cedural discretion is objective: did the court consider all proper factors
and exclude from its consideration all improper factors? The latter term
refers to the subjective use by a court of the factors which it considers
in reaching a sentencing decision. That is, once a court has exercised
procedural discretion by choosing the various factors it will consider in
rendering a sentence, the court exercises substantive discretion by weigh-
ing the factors in arriving at a final disposition.
With this distinction in mind, it is necessary to ask to what degree
trial court sentencing discretion should be circumscribed. Should the
rulemaker attempt to structure procedural discretion only, by providing
a framework of standards in which judges will continue to exercise sub-
stantive discretion, or should the rulemaker provide both the questions
and the answers, leaving trial courts to conduct the ministerial function
of fitting defendants into the specific categories established by the sen-
tencing standards? Individualized sentencing would appear to require
the former; structuring substantive discretion creates the dangers of in-
flexibility inherent in a standard sentencing policy. Perhaps the best
solution lies between these extremes. The rulemaker should develop spe-
cific standards to control the exercise of procedural discretion, and issue
statements of policy to guide the exercise of substantive discretion.
Until the rule of nonreview is abandoned, or rules are developed
which will allow a closer appellate scrutiny of the sentencing decision,
the approach of a few enlightened courts remains the only hope for a
defendant who believes his sentence is the product of abuse. The prin-
ciples of our criminal justice system conflict with this haphazard ap-
proach, and it is expected that the legal community will tolerate its ex-
istence only as long as is necessary to develop a proper solution.
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